Is Responsibility to Protect (R2P) the shape of Never Again?

I took my son and attended a briefing at the Brookings Institution titled, "Libya and the Responsibility to Protect" (you can download the full audio here).  Here's a summary of the topic:

The Libyan crisis has brought focus to the critical and complex issue of the “responsibility to protect” populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. In Libya and beyond, the international community is faced with urgent tests of a hotly debated doctrine about when, where and how nations should respond to populations threatened with the gravest international crimes. Now more than ever, real world events are being discussed in terms of the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine, or R2P, which was adopted by all the world’s governments in 2005 and appeared explicitly in the 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, which authorized force in Libya, also invoked the responsibility to protect as part of its argument for action.

The topic caught my attention for many reasons, not the least of which was the involvement of the USHMM's Committee on Conscience.  The discussion opened with reference to the promise "Never Again" that we vow in response to the Holocaust but quickly made clear how complicated it can be to implement such a promise in reality.  Many of the historical references were above the head of my son, 13 years old, but the essential confusion around the issue and its practical implementation was as clear to him as anyone.  He left frustrated, feeling that nobody ever directly answered the question about R2P - specifically why and how it gets applied in one situation but not another (Libya but not Syria, for example).  I suspect many felt the same way.  A more nuanced listener may have heard more from the panelists.  But I don't think many could leave the talk feeling bolstered about R2P's application in reality.  Personally, I learned that at best R2P may be able help get a situation onto the agenda but the decision to use force will never be dictated by R2P.  Politics and personality will guide those decisions.

Interesting points from the talk: Prof. Sewall talking about the use of force - particularly given the Western preference for air power - for humanitarian purposes is a decision to trade civilian casualties for civilian casualties.  Also, her warning to be mindful of mission creep in any operation.
Richard Williamson's admission that we simply need better evidence in order to make these decisions and then citing an article that drew parallels between Bush entering Iraq and Obama in Libya - both decisions based on "evidence" of worse trouble to come if we didn't act beforehand.

I'm glad I went but I left with as many, if not more, questions than I had at the start.